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Sobrecarga de informação, adiamento de escolha e a 
função moderadora de need for cognition: evidência 
empírica
Aumento da propensão a evitar a escolha em função da sobrecarga 
de informações é um tema sujeito a debate intenso. Os modelos de 
maximização neoclássica prevêem que a propensão a evitar escolha 
não aumente com a oferta de mais informação ao consumidores. 
Diferentemente, os modelos com origem na psicologia cognitiva 
predizem que as características do ambiente de decisão podem 
provocar efeitos comportamentais que aumentem a propensão a 
não escolher, em função da sobrecarga de informação.A partir de 
estímulos gerados experimentalmente, esta pesquisa empírica torna 
evidente a presença de efeitos comportamentais provocados pela 
sobrecarga de informação, revela diferenças no efeitos provocados 
pela variação no número de opções em comparação ao número de 
atributos e demonstra que a característica de personalidade need 
for cognition modera tais efeitos comportamentais.
Palavras-chave: efeitos comportamentais, adiamento de escolha, sobre- 
 carga de informações, need for cognition.
1. INTRODUCTION
The consumers’ judgment and decision-making process is an extensively 
studied theme in several disciplines of social sciences. There are two relevant 
approaches to the field. First, the normative theories developed in economics 
set the bases for consumer rationality, represented in axioms describing a 
process of subjective utility maximization, which implies consumers’ decision 
making supported by stable and well-defined preferences (Fishburn, 1968; 
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Von Neumann & Morgenstern, 1947){Von Neumann, 1947, 
The theory of games and economic behavior;Fishburn, 1968, 
Utility theory}. Second, the descriptive theories from cognitive 
psychology and consumer behavior challenge the normative 
models assuming that the human brain faces cognitive limits, 
preventing the development, storage, and recovery of complete 
and stable preferences. This means that such preferences are 
made during the decision-making process, emphasizing contex-
tual elements in the formation of preferences (Bettman, Luce, 
& Payne, 1998; Payne, 1982; Simon, 1955, 1990).
The number of variables involved in decision making is 
one of the features of the environment that impacts the final 
choice (Einhorn, 1970). Information overload is defined as the 
available amount that makes the information confusing and 
dysfunctional, given the time restriction involved in decision-
-making processes (Jacoby, 1977; Jacoby, Speller, & Berning, 
1974; Jacoby, Speller, & Kohn, 1974).
The debate about this issue is intense, with claims suppor-
ting or challenging the increase in the information amount avai-
lable in the decision environment. The opportunities to study the 
relationship between information load and choice are still open. 
Normative and empirical evidence is present in studies favoring 
the increase in the availability of information and choice in the 
decision environment (Anderson, 2003; Berger, Draganska, & 
Simonson, 2007; Bown, Read, & Summers, 2003; Hutchinson, 
2005; Malhotra, Jain, & Lagakos, 1982; Oppewal & Koelemei-
jer, 2005), as well as in those arguing about the dysfunctionality 
of information overload (Botti & Iyengar, 2006; Fasolo, Her-
twig, Huber, & Ludwig, 2009; Iyengar & Lepper, 2000; Jacoby, 
Speller, & Kohn, 1974; Schwartz, 2004; Zeelenberg, 1999). 
The divergences in the body of empirical evidence related to 
the theme can also be explained by conceptual and operational 
definitions used by researchers for the necessary elements that 
map the phenomena, such as the (a) antecedents of information 
overload, specifically how to define the information amount 
in the decision environment; (b) consequences of information 
overload; (c) preconditions or situational variables that must 
be present to trigger the effects of information overload; and 
(d) underlying processes that would connect the amount of 
information to its dysfunctional consequences.
Information load is defined as brands or options, infor-
mation dimensions or attributes, and the value of each infor-
mation dimension or attribute (Jacoby, 1977). The following 
operational definitions of the information amount are present 
in empirical studies: (a) number of options and number of 
attributes (Jacoby, Speller, & Berning, 1974; Jacoby, Speller, 
& Kohn, 1974; Malhotra, 1982; Malhotra et al., 1982; Russo, 
1974; Wilkie, 1974), (b) number of attributes (Hahn, Lawson, 
& Lee, 1992; Keller & Staelin, 1987; Russo, 1974; Scammon, 
1977), and (c) number of options, which is the most frequent 
definition ((Berger et al., 2007; Gourville & Soman, 2005; 
Haynes, 2009; Mogilner, Rudnick, & Iyengar, 2008; Scheibe-
henne, Greifeneder, & Todd, 2009; Sela, Berger, & Liu, 2009).
Information load has many consequences, varying in its 
nature and operational definition. A possible categorization 
of these effects is to classify them in terms of manifested and 
observable behaviors, as well as psychological states, which 
are subjective mental dispositions and nonobservable.
The following behavioral consequences have been used to 
define the effects of information overload: (a) choice quality 
that may be assessed by subjective (Hahn et al., 1992; Jacoby, 
Speller, & Berning, 1974; Jacoby, Speller, & Kohn, 1974; 
Keller & Staelin, 1987; Malhotra, 1982; Malhotra et al., 1982; 
Russo, 1974; Wilkie, 1974) or objective criteria (Lurie, 2004; 
Malhotra et al., 1982; Scammon, 1977) and (b) choice avoid-
ance that may be expressed (Scheibehenne et al., 2009)either as 
the preference for the status quo (Chernev, 2003; Dhar, Nowlis, 
& Sherman, 1999; Iyengar & Lepper, 2000; List, 2004)(Dhar 
et al., 1999; Iyengar and Lepper, 2000; Chernev, 2003; List, 
2004; Scheibehenne et al., 2009) or choice deferral (Dhar, 
1997a, 1997b; Dhar & Nowlis, 1999; Shah & Wolford, 2007).
The violations of the consumers’ rationality perspective 
might be moderated by the presence of situational or indivi-
dual variables setting the conditions for the occurrence of the 
information overload phenomena, such as the lack of familiarity 
or prior preferences (Chernev, 2003; Iyengar & Lepper, 2000; 
Mogilner et al., 2008), options arrangement (Broniarczyk, 
Hoyer, & McAlister, 1998; Mogilner et al., 2008), time pres-
sure (Dhar & Nowlis, 1999; Hahn et al., 1992; Haynes, 2009), 
personality traits (Dar-Nimrod, Rawn, Lehman, & Schwartz, 
2009; Malhotra, 1982), and the order of options evaluation (Li 
& Epley, 2009).
Finally, mediational elements have been examined, and past 
studies have explained information overload as the by-product 
of (a) psychological processes as the necessity to justify choices 
(Sela et al., 2009), regret anticipation, variety seeking, and va-
riety perception and (b) the information structure or properties 
such as the quality of available information (Keller & Staelin, 
1987), attribute consistency (Berger et al., 2007), attribute 
alignability (Gourville & Soman, 2005), and the distribution 
of attribute levels across dimensions (Lurie, 2004).
This article focuses on one of the behavioral consequen-
ces of information overload, which is choice deferral or the 
individual tendency to postpone a decision, expressed as the 
individual preference for not choosing any option in a specific 
task decision. Given that the option of not choosing is an actual 
option in many real decision occasions (Dhar, 1997a), this 
behavior can be performed either to allow for the consideration 
of additional information sources or to evaluate more options 
that will eventually be offered (Dhar, 1997b). The occurrence 
of choice deferral has been related to the valence of the unique 
and shared attributes (Dhar & Sherman, 1996), time pressure 
(Dhar & Nowlis, 1999; Dhar & Sherman, 1996), the perceived 
similarity of the options and choice difficulty (Kim, Novemsky, 
& Dhar, 2013), preference uncertainty (Dhar, 1997a) and the 
options comparison mode (Dhar et al., 1999; Dhar & Sherman, 
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1996). The present study on choice deferral follows an experi-
mental design, which controls the information load effects of 
the number of options and the number of attributes. Since the 
beginning of the information overload controversy, most of the 
studies have examined the role of the number of options or the 
number of attributes. On the other hand, this empirical research 
explores the independent role of each of these variables, as well 
its interaction pattern.
Furthermore, the evidence for information overload is se-
arched in the domain of high relevance, with opportunities for 
preference formation, conditions that are expected to prevent 
the occurrence of the phenomena. Other elements that may set 
the border conditions for information overload are a personality 
trait (the need for cognition [NFC]) that may act as a moderator 
effect, and an information structure (entropy) that may act as a 
mediator between the information amount and choice deferral.
The current design addresses several challenges faced by the 
study on information overload (Broniarczyk, 2008). First, three 
levels for the number of options and three levels for the number 
of attributes were manipulated, allowing for the estimation of 
linear and nonlinear effects. Second, the manipulation of the 
number of attributes allows for the isolation of the effects of 
the number of options. Third, the design of the stimuli allows 
for the estimation of the effects of the number of options after 
accounting for the information structure. Additionally, it allo-
ws for the understanding of the effect of repeated consumer 
decisions as a border condition for the occurrence of choice 
deferral (Dhar & Sherman, 1996).
After this introduction, this article is divided into three 
sections: (a) the literature review, presenting the arguments 
either favoring or challenging more information in the deci-
sion environment, and the main findings relating information 
overload to choice deferral; (b) the methods and results of the 
empirical research conducted in two phases, first, selecting a 
product category and second, studying the phenomena; and (c) 
the discussion about the results’ implications and opportunities 
for future studies.
2. LITERATURE REVIEW
A decision is an adaptive behavior expected to change the 
individual state in response to environmental cues and can be 
considered a process that produces the outcome. In this sense, 
the decision making is a sequence of cognitive and behavioral 
events that produces a selective outcome (Jacoby, Chestnut, 
& Fisher, 1978). The outcome results from a choice among 
actions or options, represented as sets of alternatives composed 
of attributes or consequences and involving contingencies or 
conditional probabilities that connect the consequences to the 
actions or options (Bettman et al., 1998; Tversky & Kahneman, 
1981). The decision set may possibly fluctuate in size, incre-
asing the decision complexity as the number of options or 
attributes becomes larger. Attributes can vary in their potential 
consequences, in the level of evoked desire, and in individuals’ 
willingness to tradeoff one attribute for any other. Moreover, the 
existing information may be dissimilar in option or in attribute, 
or different options may imply the awareness about different 
attributes (Bettman et al., 1998; Tversky & Kahneman, 1981).
2.1. Arguments supporting more information in choice  
 environment
The natural human tendency toward activity and integration 
is supported by the intrinsic motivation development, which 
is facilitated in social environments that foster autonomy and 
competence, as can be the case when someone is making 
uncontrolled choices among valued options (Moller, Deci, & 
Ryan, 2006; Ryan & Deci, 2000). The knowledge and ability 
to choose among options are border conditions defining beha-
vioral freedom; when the perceived freedom is threatened, 
individuals tend to react to restore it (Brehm & Brehm, 2013). 
In summary, the idea of freedom of choice is closely related to 
self-determination and well-being, and individuals are prone to 
favor decision sequences that permit the identification of addi-
tional consecutive choices, even when the decision structures 
lead to equivalent outcomes (Bown et al., 2003).
The body of empirical evidence supports several arguments. 
Consumers perceive more variety, quality, and expertise from 
brands offering larger consistent assortments, and these brands 
tend to be rewarded with larger choice shares (Berger et al., 
2007). Consumers evaluate larger assortments more positi-
vely (Oppewal & Koelemeijer, 2005), which help strengthen 
preferences among individuals, with ideal structures available 
(Chernev, 2003). Choices in the context of a larger number of 
options are more enjoyable (Haynes, 2009; Iyengar & Lepper, 
2000). Satisfaction after product consumption is higher among 
consumers who had the opportunity to choose the product than 
among those who could not do so (Iyengar & Lepper, 2000). 
According to the normative approaches, either driven by the 
consumer search for variety or by the heterogeneity in consumer 
preferences, product variety will increase as markets expand, 
with boundaries set by market structure characteristics rather 
than by consumer limits (Lancaster, 1990).
Consistent with the independence axiom (Von Neumann 
& Morgenstern, 1947) and considering choice avoidance as a 
current option in any decision task, from the rational choice 
model’s viewpoint, the no-choice option either delimits a uti-
lity threshold in terms of being exceeded by any other option 
intended to be chosen or carries the value of expecting more 
information in the future. Moreover, even considering a limit 
in brainpower, it is possible to derive from the principles of 
human rationality that additional information will be processed 
up to the point that the marginal cost of its acquisition reaches 
the marginal incentive of processing more information (Stigler, 
1961). The truncation of information processing at this point 
may prevent the choice deferral from being reduced when a 
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new option is added to the choice set. It means that the pro-
bability of the no-choice option having the highest utility in a 
choice task should decline or stay constant as new options are 
added to the decision environment (Rieskamp, Busemeyer, & 
Mellers, 2006).
Therefore, because of the expected utility theory, the addi-
tion of a new option in a decision set could merely increase the 
probability of a match between one of the presented alternatives 
and the consumer’s preference, reducing the likelihood of a 
no-choice result.
Two general hypotheses to be tested in the present study are 
derived from the rational choice model, as follows:
P.1. Under the neoclassical maximization model, choice 
deferral is reduced or stays constant as more options are 
added to the choice environment.
P.2. Under the neoclassical maximization model, choice de-
ferral is reduced or stays constant as more attributes are 
used to describe the existing options.
2.2. Arguments supporting the existence of information  
 overload
An alternative account of human judgment and decision 
making implies that in response to the restricted working 
memory and to the limitations in both the human brainpower 
and the speed of information processing, most activities are 
performed through approximation methods. Such methods 
cause behavior to be shaped from the interaction between the 
human brain and the environmental features in order to pro-
duce a satisfactory solution from tolerable processing efforts 
(Simon, 1990).
The idea of bounded rationality leads to the formation of 
preference structures in the course of judgment and decision 
making, contingent to the context due either to cognitive res-
trictions or to the existence of multiple objectives (Bettman 
et al., 1998; Payne, 1982). A contextual setting that shapes 
behavior includes (a) the object or stimulus to be evaluated, 
(b) any situational variables defining the place and time of 
observation that describe neither consumer nor stimulus cha-
racteristics, and (c) enduring (over place and time) individual 
attributes such as personality, gender, and others (Belk, 1975). 
In summary, bounded rationality inhibits behaviors seeking 
maximization and leads the individual to engage in different 
strategies, depending on the context. Such strategies are defined 
according to four main features (Bettman et al., 1998; Payne, 
1982) as follows: (a) Information may be processed extensi-
vely or reduced to support simplification in decision making. 
(b) Information processing may be consistent or selective 
per option or attribute. (c) Information may be processed by 
means of either options or attributes. (d) A strategy can be 
compensatory, involving explicit tradeoffs among attributes, 
or noncompensatory, when one negative value in one attribute 
is enough to eliminate the option from the consideration set. 
Therefore, changes in environmental properties, including an 
increase in the information amount, may interact with indivi-
dual characteristics and contradict the predictions derived from 
the neoclassical maximization model. 
Information amount. The information in any choice set 
that is available to consumers can vary in terms of the number 
of options, number of attributes describing each option, and 
number of values or levels that can represent each attribute 
(Jacoby, 1977). Early studies manipulated the information 
amount as the number of options and the number of attributes 
and the multiplication of both as representing the total amount 
of information (Jacoby, Speller, & Berning, 1974; Jacoby, Spell-
er, & Kohn, 1974), concluding that increases in the information 
amount jeopardized the choice quality. This original study was 
followed by those of critics (Malhotra, 1982; Malhotra et al., 
1982; Russo, 1974; Wilkie, 1974) that shaped future studies, 
postulating that (a) the number of options and the number of 
attributes are not psychologically equivalent since the effects 
of varying one or the other are not the same; thus, a multiplica-
tive approach to define the total information amount is invalid, 
and (b) the a priori probability of choosing the best option is 
reduced as the number of options increases, resulting in the 
impossibility of comparing the choices’ quality as a function 
of the varying number of attributes across conditions with 
different numbers of options.
Malhotra (1982) developed a solution to model the effects of 
the varying number of attributes, controlling for the variations 
in the number of options. Malhotra concluded that the choice 
precision would fall when the number of options was increased 
from 5 to 10 or when the number of attributes was varied from 
10 to 15, and it would become stable after these thresholds.
After this initial controversy, the following studies mani-
pulated the number of options, the number of attributes, or 
some combination of the number of options with the quali-
tative characteristics of the product attributes. The studies 
found psychological or behavioral effects resulting from such 
manipulations.
Psychological effects of information overload. Several 
mental states had been associated with information overload, 
and some of the results are still ambiguous. While Jacoby, 
Speller, & Kohn (1974) reported an increase in satisfaction 
after the choice as the number of options was increased, other 
studies indicated reduced satisfaction under similar circums-
tances, either after the choice (Haynes, 2009; Malhotra, 1982) 
or after having consumed the chosen option (Iyengar & Lepper, 
2000). There was also evidence that as the number of options 
became larger, satisfaction was reduced among maximizers 
but not among satisfiers, revealing the role of a personality 
trait related to information overload (Dar-Nimrod et al., 2009). 
The decrease in post-choice satisfaction had also been related 
to increases in the number of attributes (Scammon, 1977) and 
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in the decisions among options differentiated by negative at-
tributes and that shared positive attributes (Dhar et al., 1999).
The certainty felt by consumers about having made the 
best decision was positively related to the number of attributes 
(Jacoby, Speller, & Kohn, 1974), the quality of the relative 
importance of the attributes available in the choice set (Keller 
& Staelin, 1987), and the increase in the relative attractiveness 
of the options (Malhotra, 1982). However, it was also negati-
vely related to the number of attributes (Scammon, 1977) and 
conditionally related to the availability of an ideal point, with 
the consumers having previous preferences being more confi-
dent when choosing from larger choice sets and those without 
previous preferences being more certain when choosing from 
smaller sets. Furthermore, this effect disappeared in the second 
choice task (Chernev, 2003).
The feeling about the choice difficulty was related to the 
increase in the number of options in the choice task (Berger 
et al., 2007; Haynes, 2009; Scheibehenne et al., 2009; Sela et 
al., 2009). Beyond this general tendency, for the consumers 
without previous preferences formed, their perceived choice in 
large assortments was more difficult than those with the ideal 
point already available, with a reversed pattern observed in 
smaller assortments (Chernev, 2003). Furthermore, the choice 
became more difficult when the similarity was reduced during 
the judgment of attributes (Kim et al., 2013).
Finally, an important psychological state related to decision 
making was post-choice regret, which resulted from the imagi-
nation of a better state of well-being if a different decision had 
been made in favor of any of the rejected available options. 
Regret was positively related to the number of options (Sagi & 
Friedland, 2007), the increase in the number of options when it 
implied a tradeoff between nonalignable attributes (Gourville 
& Soman, 2005), and the dissimilarity between the chosen and 
refused options (Sagi & Friedland, 2007; Zeelenberg, 1999).
Moreover, the deployment of compensatory strategies, com-
prising the comparison of attributes among options, increases 
the perception of choice difficulty (Dhar, 1997b).
Behavioral consequences of information overload. Choi-
ce accuracy is the most evident criterion to assess consumer 
decision making, assuming a normative process that establishes 
the maximization of the expected utility as the final goal of the 
choices and the increase in the information amount as a way to 
increase the probability that a consumer will achieve such an 
objective. The most common approach considers a subjective 
process of maximization that involves the previous elicitation 
of a consumer’s preference and the comparison of the expected 
choice (predicted from this self-explained preference) with the 
observed choice.
The reduction in subjective choice accuracy had been related 
to the increases in the number of options (Hahn et al., 1992; 
Jacoby, Speller, & Berning, 1974; Jacoby, Speller, & Kohn, 1974; 
Malhotra, 1982). A nonlinear relationship (inverted U) between 
the number of options and choice accuracy was also reported, 
as well as time pressure as the condition for the occurrence of 
information overload (Hahn et al., 1992). Several studies indica-
ted instances of a positive relationship between choice accuracy 
and the number of attributes (Jacoby, Speller, & Berning, 1974; 
Malhotra, 1982; Malhotra et al., 1982; Wilkie, 1974).
A different approach for assessing choice accuracy is to de-
fine the best decision from the options’ objective characteristics 
or external evaluation and to compare consumer choices related 
to this norm. Studies using these criteria are not conclusive; for 
example, Lurie (2004) reported that accuracy decreased as the 
number of options or the number of attributes increased or as the 
distribution of attribute levels became homogeneous. However, 
Scammon (1977) and Malhotra et al. (1982) found that priming 
the attribute information increased choice accuracy compared 
to not doing so, but adding more attributes had no effect.
Choice avoidance. Most studies about information overload 
focused on how consumers chose among alternatives, setting 
aside the fact that most decisions in real contexts would involve 
the alternative of not choosing (Dhar, 1997b; Dhar & Simonson, 
2003; Parker & Schrift, 2011). More importantly, the inclusion 
of a no-choice option produced systematic effects on the selec-
tion, reducing the relative share of an option with an average 
performance on all attributes compared with the option that 
performed well in some attributes and poorly in others; it we-
akened the compromise effect and strengthened the attraction 
effect (Dhar & Simonson, 2003). Furthermore, the presence of 
a no-choice option led to a more attribute-based information 
processing, storage, and retrieval. It invoked more evaluative 
judgments and increased the importance of attributes that per-
formed close to consumer thresholds (Parker & Schrift, 2011).
Consequently, the inclusion of the no-choice option increa-
sed the ecological validity of decision-making studies, and the 
systematic effects of information overload on choice avoidance 
became an important stream in this field. Such effects had been 
tested in two variants: (a) the endowment effect or the prefe-
rence for maintaining the status quo and (b) choice deferral or 
the preference for postponing a decision.
Endowment effect is a general individual tendency to prefer 
the status quo or the default option. List (2004) argued that 
individuals given an initial dotation tended to reveal preferen-
ces biased toward this initial dotation in terms of one of two 
possible options, after engaging in trade activities that might 
alter the balance between the options. This pattern was valid for 
individual decisions in the private sphere, as well as for collec-
tive choices about public goods. In the same vein, consumers 
tended to choose a larger number of product features when 
starting the decision-making process from a complete model 
than when choosing from a base model (Biswas & Grau, 2008).
The preference for the status quo was positively related 
to the number of options in the choice set (Iyengar & Lepper, 
2000). It indicated strength when the default was a choice from 
a previous decision involving positive unique attributes and 
negative shared attributes (Dhar & Sherman, 1996) or either in 
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the context of similarity judgments among options with unique 
positive attributes or dissimilarity judgments among options 
with unique negative characteristics (Dhar et al., 1999).
Choice deferral is the preference for the no-choice alterna-
tive, allowing consumers to search for additional information 
or evaluate different options to be offered. This alternative had 
been related to the number of options in the choice set. In an 
experimental setting, arranged in a real supermarket, smaller 
and larger assortment sizes of jams and luxury chocolates 
were presented for consumers to sample products. Smaller 
assortments drew more consumers to stop for trial one of the 
options (Iyengar & Lepper, 2000).
Shah & Wolford (2007) asked subjects to evaluate sets of 
pens, with set sizes ranging from 2 to 20 pens. After their eva-
luation, the subjects were given the choice of whether or not 
to purchase one of the pens at a discounted price. The choice 
deferral had a curvilinear (inverted U) relation with the number 
of pens in the set, decreasing in up to 10 options and increasing 
after this optimal point.
Based on the nature of the effects elicited in the previous li-
terature, we have developed propositions about the relationships 
among the number of options, number of attributes, and their 
interactions. Derived from the nonlinear effects between the 
number of options in the choice task and subjective choice 
accuracy (Hahn et al., 1992), and the number of options and 
choice deferral (Shah & Wolford, 2007), we present a propo-
sition that refutes the optimization model:
Choice deferral will first decrease when the number of op-
tions varies from small to medium, and it will increase when 
the number of options varies from medium to large.
P.3. From the few studies manipulating the number of at-
tributes (Keller & Staelin, 1987; Malhotra, 1982), we 
have found support for a proposition that challenges the 
optimization model:
P.4. Choice deferral will increase when the number of attri-
butes increases.
Additionally, given the limited number of studies manipu-
lating the number of options and number of attributes (Jacoby, 
Speller, & Berning, 1974; Jacoby, Speller, & Kohn, 1974; 
Malhotra et al., 1982) and the inconclusive evidence supporting 
the interaction pattern, such effects will be investigated without 
prior propositions.
Context effects drive choice deferral, which increases when 
options have unique bad attributes and share good ones, options’ 
attractiveness is reduced, (Dhar, 1997a, 1997b; Dhar & Sher-
man, 1996), a dominant option is not present in the choice set 
(Dhar, 1997a; White & Hoffrage, 2009), or the perceived simi-
larity increases (Kim et al., 2013). The mechanism behind such 
context effects is the preference uncertainty, resulting from an 
individual’s reduced ability to distinguish the preferred option, 
since the inclusion of a new option increases the likelihood of 
the new option’s utility to be comparable to the best option in 
the original choice set (Dhar, 1997a; White & Hoffrage, 2009).
An alternative account is that the choice complexity is 
determined by environmental properties that can be derived 
from the information structure, such as entropy and density, 
rather than the amount of information (Fasolo et al., 2009). 
Entropy is defined as the existing amount of information for 
making a judgment and is a function of two characteristics of 
the environment. One is the number of attribute levels present in 
the choice task, and the other is the distribution of the attribute 
levels among the options. The larger the number of attribute le-
vels and the more uniform the distribution of such values across 
the options, the higher the entropy is and therefore, the more 
complex the decision becomes. From a psychological perspec-
tive, entropy reveals a variety of perceptions and complexities. 
Supported by these ideas, the next proposition is developed:
P.5. Choice deferral increases when the entropy in the choice 
set becomes higher.
Finally, task effects also influence the likelihood of the 
choice, with the time pressure decreasing the choice deferral 
in scenarios involving high conflicts or a selection among 
options with unique good attributes (Dhar & Nowlis, 1999; 
Dhar & Sherman, 1996). The initial comparative judgment 
also affects choice deferral. Dissimilarity judgments (compared 
to similarity judgments) increase the incidence of the choice 
when options have unique positive attributes, and the pattern is 
reversed when the task involves an initial similarity judgment 
(Dhar et al., 1999). The information format in the choice set 
is related to choice deferral, and this effect is conditioned by 
prior experience. Among the most knowledgeable consumers, 
product features presented as absolute information reduce 
choice deferral compared to information delivered as evalu-
ative numerical or verbal values, while for naïve consumers, 
the pattern is reversed (Lange & Krahé, 2014).
Consumer experience
The decision-making process is likely to evolve from a 
stage of preference construction, compatible with the infor-
mation overload perspective, to a stage of preference stability, 
compatible with the rational choice assumption. Knowledge in 
this specific domain is a driver of this change, and one of its 
components is choice experience, since it allows consumers to 
learn about the tradeoffs involved in decision making (Hoeffler 
& Ariely, 1999).
One viewpoint regarding information overload is that 
the phenomenon is observed in the case of consumers with 
limited knowledge (Iyengar & Lepper, 2000; Scheibehenne 
et al., 2009), and some studies have incorporated consumer 
experience as a variable.
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Experience in the choice domain moderates the default pre-
ference, with only inexperienced consumers being influenced 
by the endowment effect (List, 2004). Consumers presented 
with ideal points from the experimental manipulation show 
a lower preference for the default when the choice happens 
in large assortments and a higher preference for the default 
when choosing from small assortments. Moreover, consumers’ 
self-reported knowledge moderates choice deferral (Morrin, 
Broniarczyk, & Inman, 2012) and the mere categorization 
effect on choice satisfaction; experienced consumers are more 
satisfied than the naïve ones only when the assortment is not 
categorized (Mogilner et al., 2008).
Considering the evidence that relates consumer experience 
to information overload and that experience makes individuals 
more aware of possible attribute values, allowing inferences 
about the best possible products and refining expectations 
(Pinnell & Englert, 1997), the following propositions are 
presented:
P.6. Choice deferral increases as consumers gain domain-
-specific knowledge through choice repetition.
P.7. Consumer experience moderates information overload, 
which should disappear as individuals repeat choices.
Personality
Decision-making strategies are contingent on consumer 
traits, such as genetic traces, lifestyles, demographic characte-
ristics, socioeconomic status, and personality (Herrera, 2000; 
Howard & Sheth, 1969; Sheth, Mittal, & Newman, 2001). Some 
studies relate such variables to information overload.
The individual style of decision making and the goal of 
a choice are related on a scale that portrays the individual 
propensity to maximize, meaning to aim for the best possible 
result, or to satisfy, meaning to desire a good enough outcome 
based on any subjective criteria. Maximizers are less likely 
to be satisfied and more likely to have regrets after decision 
making (Schwartz et al., 2002). In the context of information 
overload, maximizers tend to prefer more options but to be less 
satisfied and to have more regrets when compared to satisfiers 
(Dar-Nimrod et al., 2009).
Cognitive complexity refers to the cognitive structures 
that individuals deploy to perceive and organize stimuli and 
reflects the degree of information processing in terms of (a) 
differentiation or the number of dimensions used in informa-
tion processing, (b) discrimination or the number of categories 
construed from the object, and (c) integration or the degree of 
interconnection among the elements of the same domain (Mal-
hotra, Jain, Patil, Pinson, & Wu, 2010). Cognitive complexity 
influences how consumers process information in choice tasks, 
and those scoring high on this trait are less likely to be affected 
by information overload (Malhotra, 1982).
The NFC refers to “the tendency for an individual to en-
gage in and enjoy thinking” (Cacioppo & Petty, 1982, p. 116). 
Consumers scoring high on the NFC tend to develop stronger 
preferences compared to those scoring low on this scale, when 
choosing from large assortments. When choosing from small 
assortments, the results are reversed (Lin & Wu, 2006). These 
results can be related to the idea that preference elicitation 
supports the development of stronger preferences, mainly 
when the choice is made in large assortments (Chernev, 2003).
The NFC is particularly relevant because it is a general 
trait instead of one related to the decision-making style. The 
relationship between the NFC and choice suggests that those 
scoring high on this scale tend to engage in tradeoffs, behaving 
more likely as rational decision makers. Considering their li-
kelihood to process information in a more systematic way and 
to build stronger preferences, we propose that:
P.8. Consumers scoring high on the NFC will defer their choices 
more often than consumers scoring low on the NFC.
This proposition derives from the fact that consumers 
with a high-level NFC allocate more cognitive resources 
(since they enjoy thinking) to the development of preferences 
during choice tasks. However, it is important to note that the 
NFC does not differentiate among cognitive resources but the 
levels of willingness to deploy it. Considering that information 
overload refers to the existence of an amount of information 
that is beyond the human brain’s capacity to acquire, store, and 
process, we present the last proposition:
P.3. Information overload will affect consumers scoring high 
on the NFC (since they will deplete their cognitive re-
sources early) before it affects those scoring low on the 
NFC.
Empirical research
As described in the literature review, the information 
amount is an exogenous variable conditioning consumer 
decision making, and it opposes predictions from normative 
rational choice theories and those developed under the paradigm 
of bounded rationality. This empirical research studied choice 
deferral as a function of the information amount, with the latter 
defined as the number of options existing in the choice set and 
the number of attributes (or information dimensions) used to 
describe each option.
Since previous literature revealed the lack of familiarity as 
a precondition for information overload, using trivial decisions 
to illustrate the phenomenon, we looked for a product category 
that could motivate consumers to process information due to 
its subjective importance. Empirical evidence in this kind of 
decision making could provide stronger support for the occur-
rence of the phenomenon. To identify this product category, a 
first-survey questionnaire was administered to 100 consumers.
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A second study with an experimental design was conducted, 
considering that choice deferral would be contingent on the 
decision environment and consumer characteristics. To further 
explore border conditions, we incorporated choice repetition, the 
information structure, and the NFC into the analytical model.
Information amount
The experimental manipulation focused on the information 
amount, defined as the number of options and the number of 
attributes. Three levels of each of these variables allowed the 
estimation of linear and nonlinear effects.
The three levels of the first variable comprised 4, 8, and 12 
options, respectively. The few studies that manipulated more 
than two levels suggested that increases in optimal decision 
making would happen at around 6 to 10 options (Hahn et al., 
1992; Malhotra, 1982; Shah & Wolford, 2007). The proposed 
three levels offered the opportunity for the addition of infor-
mation to reduce choice deferral and then to increase it.
Similarly, the three levels of the second variable consisted 
of 4, 8, and 12 attributes, following the same logic and based 
on the only study that examined the choice accuracy by varying 
the number of attributes to search for nonlinear effects (Keller 
& Staelin, 1987).
Choice repetition
A stable preference had been proposed as a border condition 
for information overload and could be developed through pre-
ference elicitation, choice repetition, or experience (Chernev, 
2003; Hoeffler & Ariely, 1999; List, 2003). Repetition would 
result in learning about the expected distribution of the values 
of the attributes, causing stability in preferences due to better 
knowledge about the expected values of the attributes and 
raising the threshold for choice once consumers could wait for 
a better option, meaning that choice deferral would be higher 
for latter tasks.
To develop preferences for an initial common point, the 
participants answered about the desirability of 11 of the 12 
attributes presented in the study (except for price). Therefore, 
every respondent had the opportunity to articulate an ideal point 
that would represent an initial border condition for information 
overload.
Furthermore, each participant evaluated 17 different choi-
ce tasks and could have developed (during the experimental 
manipulation) domain knowledge to attenuate the information 
overload effects. The order of the choice tasks was used as a 
covariate to assess the impact of experience on choice deferral. 
Information structure
The information structure had been proposed as a task 
property potentially causing information overload beyond the 
information amount itself (Berger et al., 2007; Fasolo et al., 
2009; Gourville & Soman, 2005; Keller & Staelin, 1987; Lurie, 
2004). One specific informational characteristic of a choice 
set is product similarity; the more similar the products are, the 
more difficulty consumers face in determining the best option 
(Dhar, 1997a).
Intra-attribute entropy was used as a covariate to capture 
the similarity among options, and it was calculated for each 
choice set, following Van Herpen & Pieters (2002) procedure. 
For inclusion in the model, the entropy in each choice task 
was subtracted from the average of entropies of all the choice 
tasks. Despite the absence of the experimental manipulation of 
entropy, its presence as a covariate permitted the explanation of 
the results at the average levels of this variable and the eventual 
understanding of the variations in choice deferral when the 
entropy deviated from the average.
Individual characteristics
Finally, the reduced version, composed of 18 items (α = 
0.71) measuring the NFC (Cacioppo & Petty, 1982; Caciop-
po, Petty, & Feng Kao, 1984), was used as a personality trait 
moderating the relation between the information amount and 
the no-choice preference. The NFC refers to the individual 
willingness to engage in and obtain satisfaction from tasks that 
demand cognitive effort.
As the increase in the amount of information hints at a gre-
ater decision-making complexity, demanding more cognitive 
effort to process the accessible information, the readiness to 
respond to the stimuli may well be contingent on this perso-
nality trait.
First stage - data collection, questionnaires, and results
The willingness to process information is dependent on 
the subjective importance of the product under consideration, 
since this characteristic is supposed to explain the activation 
of alternative mental processes subjacent to decision making 
(Howard & Sheth, 1969; Jacoby et al., 1978).
This subjective importance was operationally defined as 
consumer involvement, and it was measured by using the 
Personal Involvement Inventory scale. This scale was proposed 
by Zaichkowsky (1985) and reduced by Mittal (1995), who 
concluded that the instrument would capture involvement with 
the product, as well as the decision-making process.
The purpose was to select a high-involvement category, 
since it would favor compensatory strategies, and the presence 
of behavioral effects in this kind of decision would provide 
evidence that any decision would be subject to the power and 
memory limitations of the human brain.
Ten categories were evaluated in the first stage: financial in-
vestment, Blu-ray or DVD player, credit card, toothpaste, stove, 
printer, yogurt, notebook, shampoo, and 32” to 50” television. 
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The data was collected from February 17 to 23, 2012. Con-
sumers were recruited from an online consumer panel (Livra 
Panels), a company supplying access to consumers who are 
willing to answer market research questionnaires. The sample 
size comprised 100 completed interviews with men and women 
aged 18 years old and above. Furthermore, the socioeconomic 
status of the households was estimated by using Criterio Brasil 
(Brazilian Association of Research Companies [ABEP], www.
abep.org.br).
Beyond consumer involvement, for each product category, 
the following information was obtained from every partici-
pant: ownership, consumption or use, purchase intent, and the 
respondent’s role in the decision-making process.
Table 1 details the results regarding the consumer involve-
ment by product category. The measurement scale ranges from 
one to seven, with one meaning a low level of involvement 
and seven meaning a high level of involvement. The scale 
reliability, assessed by Cronbach’s α, varied from 0.86 (stove) 
to 0.93 (credit card).
Based on these results, the product chosen was the 32” to 
50” television, and Cronbach’s α for this category was 0.89. 
Three reasons supported the choice of this category for the next 
stage of this research. The first was the high involvement with 
the category, which should motivate information processing 
and allow the observation of behavioral effects across a larger 
continuum of the amount of information.
Second, consumer involvement was high, regardless of the 
respondent’s demographic characteristics or purchase intent. 
The following variables were analyzed, and significant diffe-
rences among subgroups could be rejected: purchase intent 
over the next two years, t (2, 98) = 0.68, p > 0.1; age, F (3, 99) 
= 1.27, p > 0.1; and socioeconomic status, F (2, 98) = 1.06, p 
> 0.1. The only difference found was in terms of gender, t (2, 
98) = 2.60, p < 0.05. Consumer involvement was higher for 
men (5.7), but it was still high among women (5.0).
The third reason pertained to the number of attributes that 
could be used to describe the product and the ease of obtaining 
its values from websites.
Second stage - data collection and questionnaire
A randomized, full factorial 3 (4, 8, and 12 options) X 3 
(4, 8, and 12 attributes) experimental design was deployed. 
For each design cell, 120 versions of 17 choice sets were 
generated, using the CBC/WEB 7.0 from Sawtooth Software, 
meaning that each respondent evaluated a different set of 
choice tasks.
For each item, the respondents picked their preferred option 
and then compared this product to a nonchoice option. An 
example of one choice task with four options and eight attribu-
tes is illustrated in Figure 1. For each stimulus, the brand was 
the first attribute displayed, and the price was the last one. The 
display order of the remaining information dimensions was ran-
domized within the experimental design to avoid order effects.
The dependent variable in each choice set was the preferen-
ce or nonpreference for the nonchoice alternative. Assuming 
that this variable followed a binomial distribution and that 
each respondent evaluated 17 choice tasks, a multilevel logistic 
regression was deployed for analysis (Menard, 2002).
The importance of the designed experiment was to allow 
for the identification of the effect—considering the presence 
and intensity—of a broad continuum of the information amount 
(defined as the number of options and attributes) on choice 
avoidance.
The choices among a set of options constitute a good re-
presentation of the discrete choices that consumers are used 
to making every day and allow the study of the variance in 
decisions due to the information amount and the structure of 
the stimuli (DeSarbo, Ramaswamy, & Cohen, 1995; Elrod, 
Louviere, & Davey, 1992; Louviere, 1988).
The data was collected from March 20 to 28, 2012. In 
total, 1,008 consumers were recruited from Livra Panels to 
participate in a computer-aided web interview. To be eligible 
for the interview, the participant must be 18 years old or older 
and live in a household classified under segment A, B, or C, 
according to Critério Brasil.
The total sample was stratified by demographic variables 
and randomized across treatments. Table 2 presents the sam-
ple profile details, and the statistical test results reveal the 
randomization success. For the gender, we observed χ2 (8, 
1.000) = 6.13, p > 0.1; for age, χ2 (24, 984) = 25.01, p > 0.1; 
and for socioeconomic status, χ2 (16, 992) = 14.44, p > 0.1. 
Overall, the experimental treatments were independent of the 
demographic profile.
Table 1
Involvement by Category
Category Base Cronbach’s α Involvement
Toothpaste 100 0.86 5.3
TV 100 0.89 5.3
Notebook 100 0.86 5.2
Shampoo 100 0.83 5.1
Stove 100 0.86 5.1
Yogurt 100 0.87 4.8
Credit Card 100 0.93 4.7
Printer 100 0.89 4.6
Blu-ray or DVD 
player 100 0.88 4.6
Financial 
investment 100 0.87 4.4
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3. RESULTS
The results detailed in Table 3 allow the interpretation of 
the information load effects, as well as the role of the propo-
sed moderators. To interpret the parameters of these models, 
it is important to observe some details of the coding scheme, 
designed to allow for floodlight analysis (Spiller et al., 2013), 
as follows: (a) The linear term for the number of options and 
the number of attributes results in the intermediate level (8) for 
both variables to be coded as zero, meaning that the parameters 
Table 2
Sample Profile (Column %)
Total
Treatment (option X attributes)
12x12 8x12 4x12 12x8 8x8 4x8 12x4 8x4 4x4
Sample 1,008 111 112 112 112 113 111 111 114 112
Gender
Female 48.4 45.0 45.5 47.3 47.3 50.4 46.8 56.8 43.9 52.7
Male 51.6 55.0 54.5 52.7 52.7 49.6 53.2 43.2 56.1 47.3
Age
18 to 24 8.0 5.4 8.0 9.8 5.4 4.4 10.8 9.9 11.4 7.1
25 to 34 30.9 29.7 41.1 29.5 27.7 27.4 31.5 36.0 28.9 25.9
35 to 44 25.1 26.1 22.3 28.6 22.3 29.2 25.2 25.2 21.1 25.9
 45 or + 36.0 38.7 28.6 32.1 44.6 38.9 32.4 28.8 38.6 41.1
Socioeconomic status (Critério Brasil)
A 15.4 13.5 13.4 14.3 19.6 21.2 11.7 13.5 15.8 15.2
B 57.7 60.4 63.4 51.8 55.4 54.9 61.3 52.3 59.6 60.7
C 26.9 26.1 23.2 33.9 25.0 23.9 27.0 34.2 24.6 24.1
Figure 1: Example of a Choice Task
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for the number of options refer to the simple effect of changing 
this variable when the number of attributes is 8. (b) The same 
logic applies in assessing the parameters derived for the num-
ber of attributes in relation to the number of options, when the 
number of attributes is the focal independent variable. (c) The 
NFC is coded as the individual scores on the scale, implying 
that the coefficients are simple effects when the NFC is set 
at the (nonexistent) value of zero. (d) The choice repetition 
is coded as the number of the choice tasks minus one, and 
the information load coefficients are interpreted as the simple 
effects in the first choice task, since this is the one coded as 
zero. Finally, the information load should be interpreted at the 
entropy’s mean level since this is a mean-centered variable.
Information load. The simple effects of the information 
load were observed through significant regression coefficients 
(p < 0.5) for the quadratic effects of changing either the number 
of options or the number of attributes. The interactions between 
the two linear terms (for the number of options and the number 
of attributes) were also significant, as well as the interactions 
between the two quadratic terms. This complex interactive pat-
Table 3
Logistic Regression Results for Choice Deferral
Parameter B Std. Error Wald Chi-Square Sig.
Intercept -.055 .4918 .013 .910
Options - Linear effect .183 .3409 .288 .592
Options - Quadratic effect -2.648 .5950 19.804 .000
Attributes - Linear effect -.273 .3455 .626 .429
Attributes - Quadratic effect -1.865 .5957 9.800 .002
Options linear X attributes linear 1.246 .2287 29.702 .000
Options linear X attributes quadratic .336 .4049 .688 .407
Options quadratic X attributes linear .375 .4063 .853 .356
Options quadratic X attributes quadratic 1.712 .7202 5.652 .017
Entropy (mean centered) -.015 .0099 2.326 .127
Choice repetition .042 .0144 8.447 .004
NFC -.635 .1366 21.574 .000
NFC X options - Linear effect -.116 .0919 1.604 .205
NFC X options - Quadratic effect .759 .1646 21.278 .000
NFC X attributes - Linear effect .103 .0923 1.247 .264
NFC X attributes - Quadratic effect .563 .1649 11.644 .001
NFC X options linear X attributes linear -.346 .0622 30.968 .000
NFC X options linear X attributes quadratic -.063 .1109 .321 .571
NFC X options quadratic X attributes linear -.055 .1113 .240 .624
NFC X options quadratic X attributes quadratic -.475 .1987 5.724 .017
Choice repetition X options - Linear effect .004 .0098 .194 .660
Choice repetition X options - Quadratic effect .013 .0174 .533 .466
Choice repetition X attributes - Linear effect -.004 .0099 .182 .669
Choice repetition X attributes - Quadratic effect -.004 .0174 .050 .823
Choice repetition X options linear X attributes linear -.004 .0069 .343 .558
Choice repetition X options linear X attributes quadratic .005 .0120 .142 .706
Choice repetition X options quadratic X attributes linear .001 .0120 .015 .902
Choice repetition X options quadratic X attributes quadratic -.015 .0211 .516 .473
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tern would require further analysis, conducted through spotlight 
analysis (Spiller, Fitzsimons, Lynch Jr, & McClelland, 2013); 
the results are detailed in Table 4.
First, when taking the number of options as the focal inde-
pendent variable and the number of attributes as the moderator, 
with 8 information dimensions as the base level, the quadratic 
effect indicates that choice deferral increases when the number 
of options varies from 4 to 8 and decreases when it varies from 
8 to 12. When the moderator is held at 4 attributes, varying the 
number of options also reveals an inverted U-shape, but with 
fewer steps than the previous one. Finally, when the moderator 
is held at 12 attributes, the quadratic effect for the changes in the 
number of options is no longer significant, and choice deferral 
increases linearly as a function of increases in the number of 
options. These results clearly challenge P1, which states that 
choice deferral should have an inverse relationship with the 
number of options. The findings also refute P3, which proposes 
a quadratic effect with the opposite shape of the observed one 
for the variation in the number of options when the number of 
attributes is fixed at 4 or 8.
Next, the number of attributes is analyzed as the focal inde-
pendent variable, while the number of options is the moderator. 
When both are at the base level of the model (or 8 attributes 
and 8 options), a significant quadratic effect of the number of 
Table 4
Spotlight Analysis – Number of Options X Number of Attributes
Options Attributes Options  Linear Options  Quadratic
Attributes  
Linear
Attributes  
Quadratic
4 4 1.89* -1.31* -0.17 -0.49
4 8 5.48* -2.65* -1.14* -0.49
4 12 2.89* -0.56 -2.12 -0.49
8 4 -0.73* -1.31* 3.46* -1.86*
8 8 0.18 -2.65* -0.27 -1.86*
8 12 1.76* -0.56 -4.00* -1.86*
12 4 -3.35* -1.31* 0.98 0.18
12 8 -5.11* -2.65* 1.35* 0.18
12 12 0.64 -0.56 1.71 0.18
*p < 0.05
Figure 2: Spotlight Analysis – Number of Options X Number of Attributes
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attributes defines an inverted U-shape for varying the number 
of the dimensions of information. When the moderator is held 
at 4 options, the quadratic effect becomes insignificant, and 
deferral decreases as the number of attributes increases, with a 
more pronounced effect when the change is from 8 to 12 than 
when it is from 4 to 8. This finding is consistent with P2, which 
predicts a reduction in the choice deferral since the greater 
amount of information increases the probability of the presence 
of a preferred option. Finally, when the number of options is 
held at 12, increasing the number of attributes increases the 
choice deferral. This result is consistent with P4 and with the 
preference uncertainty account, since increasing the number 
of options over a limited variety of attributes tends to increase 
the similarity of perceived options, leading to the difficulty 
in determining the preferred option (Dhar, 1997a; Kim et al., 
2013; White & Hoffrage, 2009).
Overall, the results support the presence of behavioral 
effects revealing a complex pattern, which confirms that the 
number of options and the number of attributes are psycho-
logically nonequivalent (Scammon, 1977; Wilkie, 1974). 
Additionally, the interaction between the number of options 
and the number of attributes depicts an interdependency that 
was not clearly established in the previous studies exploring it 
(Jacoby, Speller, & Berning, 1974; Jacoby, Speller, & Kohn, 
1974; Malhotra, 1982; Malhotra et al., 1982). Considering that 
the interaction between the information load and personality 
imposes the interpretation of the information load coefficients 
as simple effects when the NFC is zero (Spiller et al., 2013), a 
nonexistent level on the scale, the analysis of such an interaction 
leads to further considerations about the effects of the number 
of options and the number of attributes.
Moreover, entropy has not explained the probability of 
deferring the choice (p > 0.1). This result opposes those of 
previous studies and does not support P3. In this experiment, 
the information amount was higher and variable, with entropy 
randomly introduced through the design. Additionally, entropy 
estimation involved every option in the choice set, instead of 
the similarity in the highest utility options.
Consequently, low entropy can be observed in the choice 
tasks with only low utility options, preventing the decision due 
to the absence of an attractive alternative. On the other hand, 
total entropy can be low but concentrated on the highest utility 
options, preventing the choice due to preference uncertainty. 
Therefore, the comprehension of phenomena such as attraction 
or compromise effects in scenarios with more options requires 
further efforts that permit the study of the relationship between 
entropy and preference distribution.
Consumer experience
The coefficient connecting choice repetition to the depen-
dent variable reveals that when consumers have the opportu-
nity to exercise decision making in the same context, choice 
deferral tends to increase. This pattern is consistent with P6 
and with the idea that consumers develop expectations about 
the probabilities of attribute values, refining their preferences 
and increasing their willingness to wait for an offer that best 
matches the ideal products (Pinnell & Englert, 1997).
Moreover, the coefficients that were intended to capture 
the moderating effects of consumer experience on information 
overload were insignificant, disproving P7. This finding also 
challenges the previous evidence of consumer knowledge’s 
moderating effect on the preference for the status quo (List, 
2004) and on the relationship between mere categorization and 
choice satisfaction (Mogilner et al., 2008). Additionally, it is 
different from the reported moderating effects of consumers’ 
self-reported knowledge and choice deferral (Morrin et al., 
2012).
Need for cognition
The first observation involves the positive and significant 
beta for the NFC, but given the conditional relationship expres-
sed by the interactive terms between the NFC and information 
overload, this is the simple effect of the personality measure 
when the number of options and the number of attributes are 
both set at 8. It means that at this level of information, the higher 
the NFC score, the lower the choice deferral. 
To account for the interactions among the NFC, the num-
ber of options, and the number of attributes, the execution of 
floodlight analysis (Spiller et al., 2013) through all levels of 
information load and the NFC permits the elicitation of the 
complex relationship connecting these three variables. This 
analysis is illustrated in Table 3, showing how the logistic re-
gression parameters for the information load vary at different 
levels of the NFC. When observing the number of options as 
the focal independent variable, meaning that the number of 
attributes is held at 8, it is possible to conclude that changing 
the number of options in the choice task has a linear effect, such 
that more options reduce the choice deferral when the NFC is 
3.5. Additionally, when the NFC approaches 4.1, a linear-by-
-linear interaction holds that this effect is valid only when the 
number of attributes is 8. On the other hand, when the NFC 
is below 2.9, the quadratic effect of the number of options is 
significant, meaning that the number of options increases when 
it varies from 4 to 8 and decreases when it varies from 8 to 12. 
The interactions between the quadratic terms also imply that 
this conclusion is valid only for 8 attributes in the choice task 
when the NFC’s score is less than 2.3.
When changing the focal independent variable to the num-
ber of attributes, the quadratic effect implies that the choice 
deferral peaks at 8 options for low scores of the NFC. Once 
again, the interactions between the quadratic terms limit the 
conclusion to 8 options. When the NFC is above 4.0, the signifi-
cant linear effect holds that increases in the number of attributes 
lead to an increase in the choice deferral, and the significant 
R.Adm., São Paulo, v.51, n.1, p.36-55, jan./fev./mar. 2016 49
INFORMATION OVERLOAD, CHOICE DEFERRAL, AND MODERATING ROLE OF NEED FOR COGNITION: EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE 
Table 5
Floodlight Analysis – 8 Options X 8 Attributes X NFC (Reduced Table)
NFC
Options Attributes Interactions
Linear Quadratic Linear Quadratic Linear X Linear
Linear X 
Quadratic
Quadratic 
X Linear
Quadratic X 
Quadratic
0.0 .183 -2.648* -.273 -1.865* 1.246* .336 .375 1.712*
1.0 .067 -1.888* -.170 -1.302* .900* .273 .321 1.237*
1.5 .008 -1.509* -.119 -1.021* .727* .242 .293 .999*
2.0 -.050 -1.129* -.067 -.739* .554* .210 .266 .761*
2.3 -.085 -0.901* -.036 -.571* .451* .191 .250 .619*
2.4 -.096 -0.825* -.026 -.514* .416* .185 .244 .571
2.5 -.108 -0.749* -.016 -.458 .381* .179 .239 .524
2.6 -.120 -0.673* -.005 -.402 .347* .173 .233 .476
2.7 -.131 -0.597* .005 -.346 .312* .166 .228 .428
2.8 -.143 -0.521* .015 -.289 .278* .160 .222 .381
2.9 -.155 -0.445* .025 -.233 .243* .154 .217 .333
3.0 -.166 -0.369 .036 -.177 .208* .147 .212 .286
3.1 -.178 -0.293 .046 -.121 .174* .141 .206 .238
3.2 -.189 -0.218 .056 -.064 .139 .135 .201 .191
3.3 -.201 -0.142 .067 -.008 .105 .129 .195 .143
3.4 -.213 -0.066 .077 .048 .070 .122 .190 .096
3.5 -.224 0.010 .087 .105 .035 .116 .184 .048
3.6 -.236* 0.086 .098 .161 .001 .110 .179 .001
3.7 -.248* 0.162 .108 .217 -.034 .104 .173 -.047
3.8 -.259* 0.238 .118 .273 -.068 .097 .168 -.095
3.9 -.271* 0.314 .129 .330 -.103 .091 .162 -.142
4.0 -.283* 0.390 .139* .386 -.138 .085 .157 -.190
4.1 -.294* 0.466 .149* .442 -.172* .078 .152 -.237
4.2 -.306* 0.542 .159* .498 -.207* .072 .146 -.285
4.3 -.317* 0.618 .170* .555 -.241* .066 .141 -.332
4.4 -.329* 0.694 .180* .611 -.276* .060 .135 -.380
4.5 -.341* 0.770 .190* .667 -.311* .053 .130 -.427
5.0 -.399* 1.150 .242* .949 -.483* .022 .102 -.665
linear-by-linear interaction determines that this conclusion is 
only possible when the number of options is 8.
Figure 3 presents the graphics for the floodlight analysis, 
taking the number of options as the focal independent variable 
at the three levels of the number of attributes as the moderator 
(panels a to c), as well as taking the number of attributes as 
the focal independent variable at the three levels of the number 
of options (panels d to f). For the sake of visual clarity, some 
selected levels of the NFC are plotted in the graphics.
The significance of the parameters above the score of 3.5 
for the NFC (see Table 5) reveals the behavioral pattern for 
consumers with a high-level NFC. When the number of options 
is the focal variable, the choice deferral decreases when the 
number of options increases from a range that is smaller than 
the number of attributes. It can be observed when the number 
of attributes is held at 8 and the number of options is changed 
from 4 to 8 (Figure 3 – panel b), as well as when the number of 
attributes is held at 12 and the number of options is increased, 
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either from 4 to 8 or from 8 to 12 (Figure 3 – panel c). On the 
other hand, the choice deferral increases when the number of 
options increases to some amount greater than the number of 
attributes, as can be noticed when the number of attributes is 
fixed at 4 and the number of options varies from 8 to 12 (Figure 
3 – panel a), or when the number of attributes is held at 8 and 
the number of options varies from 8 to 12 (Figure 3 – panel 
b). These results support P3 (in opposition to P1), which states 
that the relationship between the number of options and the 
choice deferral is U-shaped and suggests that the inflection is 
driven by the relation between the number of options and the 
number of attributes.
Consumers with a high-level NFC can also be analyzed 
by taking the number of attributes as the focal independent 
variable, and the same pattern can be observed. The choice 
deferral increases when the number of attributes varies from a 
number that is equal to or greater than the number of options, 
as is the case when the number of options is held at 4 and the 
number of attributes increases (Figure 3 – panel d) or when 
the number of options is held at 8 and the number of attributes 
varies from 8 to 12 (Figure 3 – panel e). However, the choice 
deferral decreases when the number of attributes increases 
from a quantity that is smaller than the number of options up 
to the point when both become equal. This is the case when 
the number of options is held at 8 and the number of attributes 
varies from 4 to 8 (Figure 3 – panel e) or when the number 
of options is held at 12 and the number of attributes increases 
(Figure 3 – panel f). Overall, P4 (in opposition to P2) is sup-
ported when the number of attributes is larger than the number 
of options. Nevertheless, a more generalizable conclusion is 
that the relationship can be described by a U-shaped format, 
with the choice deferral decreasing when the number of attri-
butes varies below the number of options and with the choice 
deferral increasing when the number of attributes varies above 
the number of options.
The results described also allow the consideration of the 
psychological processes involved in the behavioral pattern 
observed for consumers who enjoy the cognitive challenge 
of decision making. When the number of options is smaller 
than the number of attributes, the potential similarity among 
the options is reduced, as well as the probability that the 
consumer will find the ideal product. In this situation, incre-
asing the number of options will likely increase the similarity 
among the options and the probability of the presence of a best 
alternative, and the effects of the later will favor the choice. 
However, when the number of attributes becomes larger than 
the number of options, increasing the similarity among the 
choices may prevent the determination of the best option, 
leading to choice deferral, as predicted by the preference 
uncertainty explanation.
A different and reversed pattern results from the analysis of 
consumer scoring below 3 in the NFC, with the choice deferral 
tending to increase when the number of options is increased 
from a number smaller than the number of attributes and a 
choice being favored when the number of options increases 
from a number equal to the number of attributes. An inverted 
U describes the relationship between the number of options 
and the number of attributes (as can be observed in Figure 3., 
panels b and e), and the lower the NFC, the higher the peak of 
the inverted U. The likely psychological process underlying 
this pattern may be regret anticipation, which is the negative 
emotion resulting from the consideration of the foregone uti-
lity that could have been derived from the nonchosen options. 
In this case, when the number of options is smaller than the 
number of attributes, adding new alternatives may increase 
the perceived variety that drives regret. On the other hand, 
increasing the number of options when it is equal to or larger 
than the number of attributes reduces the perceived difference 
among the options, preventing regret and favoring choice.
In summary, instead of the behavioral effect proposed in 
P9 to happen first among consumers with a high-level NFC 
and later among those with a low-level NFC, both groups are 
subject to opposed behavioral effects that should be triggered 
by different psychological mechanisms. This pattern also 
challenges P8, since the level of choice deferral can be higher 
among individuals with a high- or low-level NFC, conditioned 
on the relation between the number of options and the number 
of attributes.
4. FINAL CONSIDERATIONS
The results of this study confirm the occurrence of in-
formation overload (Jacoby, 1977), as well as the lack of 
psychological equivalence between the number of options and 
the number of attributes (Russo, 1974). Moreover, contrary to 
previous studies, this one succeeded in demonstrating a clear 
interaction between the number of options and the number of 
attributes, such that the relation between choice deferral and 
information load is reversed, conditioned by the number of 
options (or attributes) being larger or smaller than the number 
of attributes (or options).
Reinforcing previous empirical evidence, this study por-
trays choice deferral as a result of information overload, but 
it has advanced by showing two different behavioral patterns 
that relate to individual personality. A U-shape represents the 
relationship between information load and choice deferral, 
and the higher the NFC score, the more pronounced is this 
pattern. An inverted U-shape describes the relation between 
information overload, and the lower the NFC score, the 
more pronounced is this pattern. While the behavioral effect 
among consumers with a high-level NFC is consistent with 
the preference uncertainty arising from tentatively eliciting 
the best option in a choice task, the pattern among consumers 
with a low-level NFC is consistent with regret anticipation, 
resulting from the objective of negative emotion minimization 
during decision making.
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Figure 3: Floodlight Analysis – Number of Options X Number of Attributes X NFC
Finally, despite consumer experience contributing to in-
creasing the choice deferral as predicted (Pinnell & Englert, 
1997), it does not moderate the reported behavioral effect, as 
demonstrated in studies using the preference for the status 
quo (List, 2004), assessing the relationship between mere 
categorization and choice satisfaction (Mogilner et al., 2008), 
or relying on consumers’ self-reported knowledge and choice 
deferral (Morrin et al., 2012).
Managerial implications
Regardless of the limitations already identified, the results 
of these studies are sufficient to demonstrate the impact of 
information overload on choice deferral, and such effects are 
neither expected by marketers nor by consumers who direct 
the efforts to produce the final choice. To cope with the incre-
asingly competitive environments that result in an escalation 
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in the number of offers, the marketers should take actions to 
simplify consumer decisions. The following managerial im-
plications are presented.
The mere categorization effect (Mogilner et al., 2008) 
implies that assortment organization facilitates consumer de-
cision making and can be implemented at three levels. First, 
at the store level, the shelf layout may favor the two-step pro-
cess likely to be involved in most consumer decision making 
(Hoeffler & Ariely, 1999), reproducing the attribute structure 
used by consumers to screen and make the final choice among 
options. Second, at the product level, managers can drive line 
extensions around the product attributes’ consistency (Berger et 
al., 2007) and alignability (Gourville & Soman, 2005). Third, 
at the brand level, choice deferral can be prevented through a 
proper brand architecture as a portfolio structure that specifies 
the role of different brands and the relationship among the 
brands and its contexts in terms of products and marketplaces 
(Aaker & Joachimsthaler, 2007, p. 133).
Moreover, possible actions are available to help consumers 
overcome the underlying processes triggering choice deferral. 
Considering the increase in technology use during a product 
information search or purchase, whenever possible, marketers 
should supply decision support systems that allow consumers to 
practice and elicit personal preferences and reduce the number 
of options, based on their preference for attributes and respective 
levels, ruling out the preference uncertainty (Botti & Iyengar, 
2006). This kind of support can be offered via technology 
applications that allow individuals to screen out nonattractive 
options and compare the remaining ones that are relevant to their 
information decisions, such as by using Web search engines.
To reduce regret anticipation, marketers may deploy 
programs expanding warranties, making it possible for con-
sumers to return products that fail to fulfill their expectations 
or to experience products before making a final commitment 
(Chernev, 2003). Consistent with this idea, product trials may 
also minimize regret.
Finally, interactions with product specialists who provide 
advisory services can help consumers identify the option that 
best matches their needs and preferences when choices involve 
complex decisions or consequences that may be relevant and 
enduring. Using this approach, marketers can reduce consumer 
uncertainty or regret (Botti & Iyengar, 2006).
Overall, it is up to marketers to define the assortment stra-
tegy in such a way that consumers can benefit from choosing 
among more options, which would increase the chance of a 
match between the offer and the preference. On the other hand, 
marketers have to manage the cognitive efforts required to make 
a decision through an adequate assortment size and the deploy-
ment of support systems to make consumer decisions easier.
Limitations and future studies
Future studies should close some gaps left by the limita-
tions faced in this study, as well as verify the actions of the 
proposed psychological mechanisms to explain the results. 
First, only one product category was studied. The replication 
with other high-involvement categories may strengthen the 
current findings’ generalizability, and the replication with 
low-involvement categories may shed light on the differences 
in information processing due to the subjective importance 
of decision making.
Second, the experimental manipulation of entropy can 
elucidate the extent to which such an environmental property 
mediates the relationship between the information amount 
and choice avoidance, since the results described in this study 
contrast those of previous studies presented in the literature 
review.
Finally, the manipulation of preference uncertainty and 
regret anticipation at the different levels of information load 
and the NFC may confirm that the opposite behavioral effects 
between the high- and low-level NFC are mediated by the 
proposed constructs.
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Information overload, choice deferral, and moderating role of need for cognition: Empirical 
evidences
Choice deferral due to information overload is an undesirable result of competitive environments. The neoclassical 
maximization models predict that choice avoidance will not increase as more information is offered to consumers. 
The theories developed in the consumer behavior field predict that some properties of the environment may lead 
to behavioral effects and an increase in choice avoidance due to information overload. Based on stimuli generated 
experimentally and tested among 1,000 consumers, this empirical research provides evidence for the presence of 
behavioral effects due to information overload and reveals the different effects of increasing the number of options 
or the number of attributes. This study also finds that the need for cognition moderates these behavioral effects, and 
it proposes psychological processes that may trigger the effects observed.
Keywords: behavioral effects, choice deferral, information overload, need for cognition
La sobrecarga de información, el aplazamiento de elegir y el papel moderador de la necesidad de 
la cognición: la evidencia empírica
Aplazamiento de elección debido a la sobrecarga de información es un resultado indeseable de entornos competitivos. 
Los modelos de maximización neoclásicos predicen que la evitación de elección no va a aumentar a medida que más 
información se ofrece a los consumidores. Las teorías desarrolladas en el campo del comportamiento del consumidor 
predicen que algunas propiedades del medio ambiente pueden provocar efectos en el comportamiento y un aumento de 
la evitación de elección debido a la sobrecarga de información. Basado en los estímulos generados experimentalmente 
y probado entre 1.000 consumidores, esta investigación empírica proporciona evidencia de la presencia de efectos 
de comportamiento debido a la sobrecarga de información y revela los diferentes efectos de aumentar el número de 
opciones o el número de atributos. Este estudio encuentra también que need for cognition modera estos efectos en el 
comportamiento, y propone procesos psicológicos que pueden desencadenar los efectos observados.
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